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COMMUNICATIONS 1355 
The Revenue Maximization Oligopoly Model: Comment 
Since Professor Baumol's substitution of constrained revenue maximiza- 
tion for profit maximization in the objective function attributed to rational 
oligopolists, the nature of the relationships between advertising outlay, 
price, output, and production cost in the oligopoly equilibrium solution has 
been radically altered [1]. However, because these relationships are clearly 
articulated neither graphically nor in the mathematical appendix of 
Baumol's book (even the revised edition), their appreciation has been 
limited. Moreover, a recent article integrating both the price and advertis- 
ing outlay variables and touted as the general statement of the Baumol 
model is, as will be shown, but a special case of the Baumol model [2]. 
In this commentary, we shall present a general model of the sales maximi- 
zation hypothesis, articulating the above relationships and remedying the 
shortfalls in generality. 
In the text of Business Behavior, Value and Growth, Baumol presents his 
admittedly "partial" sales maximization argument together with its 
equilibrium advertising outlay-price-output solution. The equilibrium out- 
put is defined with production costs and price as variables but with adver- 
tising outlay excluded. The equilibrium level of advertising depends on 
advertising outlay with production costs and presumably output held 
constant. Total revenue is a standard parabolic function of output, mar- 
ginal production cost is a positive and increasing function of output, and 
marginal revenue is a positive but decreasing function of advertising out- 
lay. Given a minimum profit constraint, Baumol demonstrates the impossi- 
bility of any combination of advertising outlay and output yielding both a 
profit above the constraint and maximum sales revenue [1, p. 60]. 
In the mathematical note, this problem is stated as one of maximizing a 
total revenue function (price times quantity) subject to a minimum profit 
constraint which includes both advertising and production outlays. Here, 
marginal production cost is taken to be positive and relevant to the deter- 
mination of the equilibrium price and output [1, p. 69]. 
In an article by R. L. Sandmeyer [2], Baumol is criticized for failing to 
integrate the sales maximizer's price policy with his advertising policy in 
describing the equilibrium. This situation is then "remedied" through a 
graphical model which "allows price, advertising outlay, and product out- 
put to change" [2, p. 1078]. Beginning in a no-advertising situation in which 
total revenue is maximized at an output unconstrained by the profit mini- 
mum, Sandmeyer demonstrates that profit in excess of the minimum will be 
devoted to advertising outlay, generating a new and higher total revenue 
function, a new price and a new excess profit level which in turn is devoted 
to advertising outlay, etc., until eventually equilibrium output, price, and 
advertising outlay are determined. At this equilibrium, the level of profit 
equals the minimum acceptable. 
Two things should be noted with respect to this model. First, it is a 
"partial" model in that all production and marketing costs are fixed and, 
consequently, the nonadvertising marginal cost of increasing sales is zero 
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over the relevant range. Second, because of the implicit zero marginal cost, 
the equilibrium defined by Sandmeyer occurs at the peak of one of the total 
revenue functions, i.e., where marginal revenue is zero-a solution which 
is inconsistent with the basic equilibrium conditions of the model as stated 
by Baumol [1, pp. 61, 69]. 
In the following model, the equilibrium for a revenue maximizer will be 
shown when price, cost, output, and advertising outlay are all free to vary. 
This model will be referred to as the general Baumol model of which both 
Baumol's "partial" presentation and Sandmeyer's model are special cases. 
Define, as does Baumol, 
D(x,a)-demand function representing the price which will be paid when 
x units are offered after a dollars of advertising outlay; 
ir-minimum acceptable profits; 
C(x)-total cost of production function: 
A (a)-total cost of advertising function; 
x D(x,a)-total revenue function representing the maximum total revenue 
saved from selling x units after a units of advertising. 
Given these definitions, we maximize the total revenue function, subject 
to a profit constraint: 
(1) x-D(x,a) -7r- C(x) - A(a) >0. 
Using the Lagrange multiplier technique (and Kuhn-Tucker conditions), 
we have: 
(2) -{ x - D(x, a)-\,[x - D(x, a) -Xr- C(x) -A (a)] < O, Ox 
da (3) aa {x.D(x, a) -X[x.D(x, a) -7 - C(x) - A(a)]} < 0. 
Differentiating (2) and (3), solving for X, and substituting, we have, for 
interior points, 
dD dC dA AD dA 
(4) x-*- = D-d + x-*-, 
cla dx da Ox da 
which is the statement of the equilibrium condition. Letting TR(x,a) 
=x-D(x,a), this equilibrium condition (4) can be written as:' 
dTR (dC dTR (dA 
(Oa dx Ox da 
Note that, by assumption, the Baumol formulation requires the following 
conditions, 
aTR dC dA 
- >0, -> - , and x- = 1, 
da dx da 
1 This condition can easily be generalized to allow for more than one output and advertisig 
outlay. See [1, pp. 68-69]. 
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[1, pp. 54, 59] which, in turn, necessitate aTRIax>O. This is to be com- 
pared with the aTRIax = 0 claimed by Sandmeyer as a characteristic of the 
equilibrium solution. 
Graphically, Sandmeyer's equilibrium position is shown as To in Figure 1. 
With the TR functions representing the relationship of total revenue to 
output at different levels of advertising outlay, the minimum profit con- 
straint represented by 7r, and the production cost function implied by the 
horizontal curve 7r+C, this solution gives an output of OQo, a price of ToQo 
/OQo, and advertising outlay of coTo=aobo. Clearly, this solution implies 
aTR/ax=dC/dx=0, which, as noted above, is inconsistent with the re- 
quirements of the generalized Baumol model. 
The solution of the general Baumol model is also shown in Figure 1. 
Again, the TR functions represent a family of total revenue functions at 
different levels of advertising outlay and the level of minimum profit is 
given by 7r. In this case the production cost function is implied by 7r+C(x) 
+a. For each level of advertising outlay, a new total cost function (includ- 
ing 7r) is observed. At output OQo, the advertising outlay is aobo = coTo, 
total production cost is equal to boTo, and total revenue equals total cost 
including the minimum profit constraint. These conditions, then are true 
of both the Sandmeyer model and the general Baumol model at output Qo. 
However, while the sales maximizer is in equilibrium at Qo in the Sand- 
meyer model, he is not in equilibrium in the general Baumol model. The 
next unit of advertising will be purchased, output will be cut back from OQo 
to OQj, the price of the output will be raised from ToQo/OQo to T1Ql/OQ1, 
and total production cost will decrease from Tobo to T1b1. The change will 
be undertaken because total sales revenue is increased from ToQo to T1Qj. 
In general, then, the sales maximizer in the general Baumol model will 
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demonstrate a smaller output, a greater advertising outlay, a higher price, 
and a greater sales volume than will the sales maximizer in the Sandmeyer 
version of the Baumol model. With dC/dx> 0, the oligopolist will find it in his 
interest to allocate profit surplus from production to advertising in the 
process of generating sales revenue. Moreover, in the general Baumol 
model the tendency toward high product price, excessive advertising out- 
lay, and more intense output restriction will be positively related to the 
elasticity of marginal cost. 
ROBERT HAVEMAN AND GILBERT DE BARTOLO* 
* The authors are, respectively, associate professor of economics, Grinnell College and senior 
economics student, Grinnell College. 
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Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in 
U.S. Manufacturing: Comment 
In responding to previous critiques of our incidence study [41, we have 
conceded that our initial effort should eventually come to be replaced by a 
more complex approach, involving a structural model in which price, wage, 
and shifting behavior are specified, and all equations are identified. While 
the required data are exceedingly difficult to obtain, such a reformulation 
may eventually be forthcoming. Such a model may not only provide better 
information on total shifting, but also show how shifting comes about and 
what "direction" it takes. It is with great anticipation, therefore, that one 
follows beyond the opening pages of a recent article by R. J. Gordon, where 
such an approach appears to be taken.' But as the paper proceeds, it be- 
comes apparent that no such improvement is offered. 
Tax-less Model 
Gordon begins with a model for a tax-less world. He defines profits as 
sales minus costs, with costs a function of quantity, wage rates, and ma- 
terial prices. Sales equals product price times quantity, where price is 
determined by a behavioral equation involving mark-up prices. This 
assumption is worth testing, although other behavior hypotheses might 
have been used as well. In equation (7), Gordon attempts to present the 
system in reduced form. Some of the variables in (7) being unavailable, he 
proceeds to make certain substitutions, thus arriving at equation (12), 
1 See [21. To simplify and to permit reference to our model, we consider the Gordon model 
only in its rate of return formulation. 
